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Abstract
The STP (Spanning Tree Protocol) which is standardized as IEEE 802.1D has been used in many
bridges and switches of networks. This algorithm tries to eliminate loops in bridged networks. In
this study the correctness of STP algorithm is formally verified using Extended Rebeca. In order
to not to be confined to a specific case or set of cases we used a compositional verification approach.
This allows us to gain generality in verifying the algorithm. The clarity and convenience in model
checking by means of Extended Rebeca suggests that this language can be used for verifying more
network protocols in future.
Keywords: Rebeca, Spanning Tree Protocol (STP), IEEE 802.1D, formal verification,
compositional verification.
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 159 (2006) 139–154
1571-0661 © 2006 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2005.12.066
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
1 Introduction
As the network grows, and more computers are added to a system, it is not
possible to place all the computers in a single LAN. Generally two or more
separate LANs are interconnected using bridges, forming an extended LAN.
Because of separate administrations in these LANs it is not easy to avoid loop
creation. Loops may cause several destructive influences in extended LANs.
If a loop exists in a network, hosts may receive duplicate packets. Also a loop
can cause the “broadcast storms” phenomenon. A broadcast storm refers to
the indefinite flooding of frames. Broadcast storms can quickly shut down a
network [5]. When a bridge that supports the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP)
recognizes a loop in the network topology; it blocks one or more redundant
ports. The bridges continually explore the network, so when the network
topology changes, STP automatically reconfigures bridge ports by blocking
certain ports to avoid the failure. The STP algorithm was first implemented
in the DEC LAN Bridges in the mid 1980s by Perlman [13], which is defined
in IEEE 802.1D standard.
Due to their exponential size of state space, network protocols are difficult to
test [11]. Furthermore, the bugs in the protocols take a significant amount of
time to be found, and replicating the error is often impossible. The formal
verification techniques can be useful for checking the correctness of network
protocols. A lot of work has been done on the verification of network pro-
tocols [3,7,16,24]. To the best of our knowledge, IEEE 802.1D has not yet
been formally verified. In this study we verified the correctness of STP using
an actor-based [1,8] model, Rebeca [19,21], and its compositional verification
appoach.
As defined in the IEEE standard 802.1D, the spanning tree protocol is a
method to detect loops and shut down redundant links. If we want to as-
sure that the protocol works properly we should guarantee that it works in
every network topology. Proving the correctness of STP in a special network
configuration does not provide information to conclude anything about the
protocol, in general. By using a compositional approach in verification we
can take a broad view of the protocol operation. The modeling language that
is used in this work is Extended Rebeca [17,19] and the corresponding tools
are used to verify our model [18,20]. Rebeca is a tool supported modeling
language that utilizes the compositional verification techniques. It is based on
the actor model. A model in Rebeca consists of a set of concurrent reactive
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reactiveclass Rebec1(2) {
knownobjects { Rebec2 d;}
statevars
msgsrv initial()
{ self.msg1();}
msgsrv msg1()
{ d.askForService();}
msgsrv msg2()
{ /* Handling message 2*/}
}
Fig. 1. A typical class definition in Rebeca
objects, which are called rebecs. The rebecs are event-driven, which means
that they respond to the received messages by executing certain codes. The
messages are put in the rebec’s queue. The main advantages of this language
in comparison with other available analogous languages can be explained in
two central capabilities: actor based modeling and compositional verification.
In Extended Rebeca [17], there are some additional features which make our
modeling process easier. Extended Rebeca aims to provide modelers with
two more useful abilities: components and synchronous message passing. A
component allows us to tie the highly coupled objects together. Synchronous
message passing can be particularly helpful in modeling some interactions
that are synchronous in their nature. The main contribution of this work is
to model 802.1D with Rebeca and use Rebeca’s compositional verification
approach and also its tool to prove STP in general.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 3 describes the Spanning Tree
Protocol in general. We introduce the key concepts of Extended Rebeca in
Section 2. Verification of a typical example is discussed in Section 4. We
explain our proof in Section 5.
2 Extended Rebeca
Rebeca (Reactive Object Language) has been designed in an effort to facilitate
the verification process for practitioners who are not experts in formal meth-
ods. From one point of view Rebeca is a Java like language which is easy to
use for software engineers, from another it is a modeling language with formal
verification support and a background theory. A model in Rebeca consists
of concurrently executing reactive objects, rebecs. Computation takes place
by asynchronous message passing between rebecs and execution of the corre-
sponding methods of messages. Each message is put in the unbounded queue
of the receiver rebec and specifies a unique method to be invoked when the
message is serviced.
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Figure 1 illustrates a simple Rebeca class definition. Although in a pure
actor model the queue length is unbounded, as a matter of model checking the
modeler has to declare the maximum queue size in the class definition. This
size shall be indicated in parenthesis next to the reactiveclass name. In a class
definition there are two central declarations: the knownobjects and statevars.
The knownobjects entry shows the rebecs that this object can communicate
with them. The statevars are responsible for holding the rebec state. After
these declarations, the message handling methods are defined in a Java like
code. We call these methods the message servers of this reactiveclass, for the
reason that their task is to serve the incoming messages. As in Java, the dot
notation is used to denote sending a message to a rebec.
The intra-object concurrency is different in actor and Rebeca. In Rebeca,
objects have a unique thread of control. This brings simplicity and ease in
model checking for Rebeca. At each step the rebec takes a message from its
queue and executes the corresponding message servers. Every reactive class
definition has a message server named initial. In the initial state, each rebec
has an initial message in its message queue, thus the first method executed
by each rebec is the initial message server. After defining the reactive classes,
there is a keyword main followed by the definition of the Rebeca model which
is a finite set of rebecs. In declaring a rebec, the bindings to its known rebecs
are specified in the list of knownobjects.
Rebeca has been extended to include two new concepts: components and syn-
chronous message passing [17]. An Extended Rebeca model is formed from a
number of components. A component typically contains some strongly cou-
pled rebecs that can be used by many models. The rebecs that are within a
component can communicate both asynchronously and synchronously. Syn-
chronous messages are modeled by handshaking and do not have a matching
message server. The calling rebec requests handshaking with another rebec by
calling a method on the target rebec. This method is not directly specified in
the rebec’s message servers, so it isn’t considered as an asynchronous message.
A rebec accepts handshaking with any caller by executing a receive statement.
If no caller rebec is waiting, it is blocked. Collaboration between components
is done through anonymous message broadcasting. Broadcasting is similar to
an ordinary asynchronous message passing, with the difference that the target
is not specified.
Compositional verification [6,15], is a feasible way to reduce the state space
and avoid the space explosion in model checking. In this approach of veri-
fication, the entire system properties are derived from the local components
properties. Commonly the components are verified in an assume guarantee
style, in which a number of assumptions are made about the environment and
the components behavior is proved conditionally on the system conjectures.
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In order to compositionally verify a Rebeca model, one should decompose the
model into a component and an environment. Each component is a subset of
the rebecs of the system, and the rest forms the environment. The behavior
of the environment is not needed to be fully modeled. The environment is
modeled by a set of messages sent to the component. It is proved in [19] by
using a weak simulation relation that if certain safety properties are satis-
fied by a component they preserve for the system. Hence the properties of
the components are proved by model checking and are used for deducing the
properties of the system.
Instead of putting the external messages in the queue, they are assumed to
be present in all the states. This requires the transition corresponding to the
execution of an external message to be always enabled. As a result, the rebecs
of a component alternate between dequeing a message from internal queue
and executing an external message.
There is also a tool, Rebeca Verifier [18,20], for translating Rebeca to the
languages of existing model checkers, Promela [22] and SMV [12]. The tool
also automates the abstraction and compositional verification approach. The
result code can be model checked by Spin [22] or NuSMV [12]. The proper-
ties which have to be checked are stated in the specification language of the
back-end model checkers. We choose Spin as our back-end model checker.
3 Spanning Tree Protocol
The network is pruned in STP by shutting down the redundant ports of
bridges. The algorithm considers the extended LAN as a graph the nodes
of which are LANs and bridges. Each bridge in an extended LAN is uniquely
identified by its bridge ID. The bridge with the lowest ID should be selected
as the root of the tree. In the resulting tree each node has a unique ancestor.
This ancestor is directly connected to the node and is on the shortest path
to the root of the tree. The ancestor of a LAN is a single bridge called the
designated bridge. The ancestor of a bridge is a single LAN, called the pre-
decessor LAN. The primary protocol data unit in STP is the Hello message
or configuration Bridge Protocol Data Unit (BPDU). Every bridge in the net-
work exchanges Hello messages to gather information about other bridges in
the network. The Hello message is a triple with three parts: the transmitting
bridge ID, the bridge ID of the root bridge and the the distance (or cost) from
this bridge to the root bridge.
By “Hello message A is better than B” we mean either that (a) the root ID
of A is smaller that B, or (b) if the root IDs are equal, the root distance of
A is smaller than B, or (c) if both the root IDs and root distances are equal
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then the transmitting bridge ID of A is smaller than B.
Hello messages are initiated in regular intervals by the root bridge and propa-
gate through the extended LAN. This propagation of the messages results in
the following [4]:
(i) The election of a unique root bridge for the stable spanning-tree network
topology.
(ii) The election of a designated bridge for every LAN segment.
(iii) The election of a predecessor LAN for every bridge.
Every bridge starts the transmission of Hello messages considering itself
as the root. When a bridge gets a Hello message it compares the value of
the root bridge ID in the message with the root bridge ID that it currently
believes in. If the value in the message is smaller, the bridge changes its belief
in the tree root. Then it sends out the Hello messages with the new value on
its other ports. Otherwise, the bridge continues to send out Hello messages
with the previous value. By this process all the bridges in the extended LAN
will eventually learn the bridge ID of the root bridge.
The election of the ancestor node is done in the same way that the root bridge
is elected. If the bridge receives a message from a LAN indicating that there is
another bridge connected to this LAN which is closer to the root, it will stop
sending messages to that LAN. As a result, only the bridge with the shortest
path to the root (or with the smaller ID in the case of equal shortest path)
will remain connected to the LAN as a designated bridge. For selecting the
predecessor LAN, each bridge considers the messages that it has received from
the connected LANs. The LAN which is closer to the root is the predecessor
LAN. In case of a tie, selection takes place similar to the designated bridge
election, taking the LAN with the smaller designated bridge ID. If a bridge is
designated for at least one LAN, it will keep its link to the predecessor LAN
enabled.
The ports operate in full duplex mode. The STP algorithm deactivates the
LAN to bridge direction for shutting down the port. The reverse direction
should be never disabled.
The dynamic changes in the network, like the election of a new root bridge,
or a bridge becoming unavailable due to a fatal error condition, will normally
result in the election of a new designated bridge [2]. The failures in the net-
work are detected by an extra field, the age field, in the Hello message. As
soon as a bridge receives a Hello message and stores it, it will take care of its
age value and constantly increases it [13]. When a designated bridge wants to
forward a Hello message to a LAN, it copies the most recent value of the age
into that message. There is a maximum bound for the age of a message, and if
H. Hojjat et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 159 (2006) 139–154144
it goes beyond this threshold a timeout will occur. Each time a timeout takes
place in the network the information is discarded and the bridges recompute
a new root or a new path [13].
We do not consider the timeout in the network, as it does not change our
approach in proving the STP algorithm. After discovering a time out in the
network, the timed out bridges find a new spanning tree with the same algo-
rithm.
4 A Typical Example
In this section we consider a typical example for verification. We model this
simple example in Rebeca, specify the required properties, and use Rebeca
Verifier tool for model checking it. In the following section we proceed to a
general proof using compositional verification approach.
4.1 The Problem Specification
The network topology of which we want to find its spanning tree is shown
in Figure 2. In this figure, the circles represent bridges. Each bridge has a
distinctive ID, which are B1, B2, and B3. Suppose that B1 < B2 < B3. The
multiple lines that come out of the circles are the bridge ports. The thick lines
are symbols for LANs. They are labeled with letters A, B and C.
In the final state, bridge B1 is selected as the root of the tree, because it has
the smallest ID of the three bridges. None of the ports of the root should
be disabled, and B1 is the designated bridge for the LANs A and B. The
designated bridge of C is B2, because B2 and B3 have equal path costs and
the ID number of bridge B2 is smaller than B3. As a result, the links which
connects bridge B1 to A and B, and bridge B2 to C have to remain enabled.
The predecessor LAN of B2 is A, so the link joining B2 to A should stay
enabled. Since B3 is not designated for any LAN, it doesn’t keep its link
to the predecessor LAN. The remaining links, which are shown in Figure 2
should be disabled.
In Rebeca, we introduce two components for modeling this example, a
bridge component which encapsulates the bridge behavior and its ports, and
a LAN component. The simplified code of the bridge is shown in Figure 3,
and Figure 4 shows the code of the LAN. We remove some trivial parts to
reduce the code size. The complete code can be found in Rebeca homepage
[14].
There are two rebecs modeling the bridge component activities: Port and
RootController. There is one Port rebec related to each LAN which is con-
nected to the bridge. This Port receives packets from its connected LAN
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Fig. 2. A typical extended LAN
and forwards it to RootController. It also forwards messages from the Root-
Controller to its LAN. The Port can be enabled or disabled by changing the
variable isEnabled variable. The RootController gets the packets from the
Ports, and compares them with its current knowledge of the network. This
comparison is made in the recvHello message server by three stages.
• If the root ID of the incoming massage from a LAN is smaller from the
belief of the bridge, the bridge cannot be designated for that LAN. Also the
LAN is set as the predecessor LAN of the bridge.
• If the root ID of the incoming massage from a LAN is equal to the belief of
the bridge, the situation is similar to above.
• If the root ID and the root distance of the incoming massage from a LAN
are equal, the ID of the sender is considered. If it is smaller than the bridge’s
ID, the bridge cannot be designated for that LAN. Also if it is smaller than
the ID of the best sender, the bridge should change its predecessor LAN.
4.2 The Verification Results
In model checking this Rebeca code, the process stopped at depth of 3818 due
to state explosion. The experiment is done on a Pentium 4 with a processor
of 2.00 GHz and a main memory of 1 Gigabytes. Then we abstract the code
by including RootController and Port reactiveclasses in one reactiveclass, and
hence removing the queues of these rebecs from the model. The proof of
correctness of our abstraction is similar to the theorem in [19] and is out of
scope of this paper. We use Rebeca to Promela translator for verification of
our model. This translator gets a Rebeca code and generates an equivalent
Promela code. We check the required properties for the generated Promela
code. Table 1, shows the model checking statistics, for the abstract model.
We specify two properties in linear temporal logic. The first property is
about the root selection. A stable condition should eventually be established
in the network in which only B1 believes that it is the root. By a stable
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reactiveclass rootController {
knownobjects { //ports}
statevars {
byte rootID; byte rootDistance;
byte myID; boolean IamRoot; byte bestSenderID;}
msgsrv initial(byte id) {//..}
msgsrv setBridgeID(byte id) { myID = id;}
msgsrv recvHello( byte senderID, byte distance, byte believedRootID){
if( believedRootID < rootID){
rootID = believedRootID;
rootDistance = distance + 1;
bestSenderID = senderID;
IamRoot = false;
sender.setBestPort(); // setting the best port
// . . . synchronizing with ports
ports.sendLan( myID, rootDistance, rootID);
}
else{
if( believedRootID == rootID && distance + 1 < rootDistance)
{// similar to above}
else{
if( believedRootID == rootID && distance + 1 == rootDistance &&
bestSenderID > senderID)
{// similar to above}
else{ // call config }
}
}
msgsrv config(){
if( IamRoot){
ports.sendLan( myID, 0, myID);
}}
reactiveclass Port{
knownobjects{
RootController rootController; LAN lan;}
statevars{
byte rootID; byte rootDistance; byte bestSenderID;
boolean isTheBestPort; boolean isEnabled; boolean isDesignated; }
msgsrv initial() { //..}
msgsrv setBestPort() {
isTheBest = true; rootController.best(); }
msgsrv setBadPort() {
isTheBest = false; rootController.bad(); }
msgsrv sendLan( byte senderID, byte distance, byte believedRootID){
if( believedRootID < rootID){
isEnabled = true;
isDesignated = true;
lan.recv( senderID, distance, believedRootID);
}
else
if( believedRootID == rootID && distance < rootDistance )
{// similar to above }
else
if( believedRootID == rootID && distance == rootDistance &&
bestSenderID > senderID)
{// similar to above}
else // i.e., the new message is worse than the previous ones
{
isDesignated = false;
if( ! isTheBest){ isEnabled = false; }
}
} }
msgsrv sendBridge( byte portID, byte senderID, byte distance, byte believedRootID)
{// sending the message to root controller & update data}
}
Fig. 3. The simpified code of the bridge component
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reactiveclass LAN(3) {
knownobjects{}
statevars{}
msgsrv initial(){}
msgsrv recv(byte portID, byte senderID, byte distance, byte believedRootID){
broadCast( portID, senderID, distance,believedRootID); } }
Fig. 4. The LAN code
Number of explored states 6.09741× 106
Memory needed to represent a system state 476 bytes
Total memory usage 1487.768 Mega bytes
Depth of state space tree 755
Table 1
Model checking statistics for the abstract model
state we mean when the beliefs of the bridges about their predecessor LAN,
and about which LAN they are designated for are reached to a steady state
assuming that the network configuration does not change during the spanning
tree formation.
Property 4.1: (♦(((IamRoot[B1]) ∧
(¬IamRoot[B2]) ∧
(¬IamRoot[B3]))))
The second property illustrates the links status in the stable state. Some
of the links should be disabled, and some of them should be enabled. All the
ports of bridge B3 will be disabled in the final network (Figure 2).
Property 4.2: (♦(((¬enabled_B3_C)∧ (¬enabled_B3_B) ∧
(enabled_B2_C)∧ (enabled_B2_A) ∧
(enabled_B1_A)∧ (enabled_B1_B))))
5 STP Proof
In the previous section, we show a specific example. In this section we use
compositional verification approach to prove STP in general.
In order to prove the correctness of the STP algorithm, we need to prove the
following properties which are adopted from [13]. These properties are proven
to be correct in a stable state.
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Fig. 5. Designated Bridge Election
(i) The Root Election: The root is elected properly and every bridge calculates the distance
of the shortest path from itself to the root bridge correctly.
(ii) Unique Designated Bridge: Each LAN has a correct unique designated bridge in the
spanning tree.
(iii) Unique Predecessor LAN: Each bridge has a correct unique predecessor LAN in the
spanning tree.
The first property is assumed to be true, and the other two are proved using
Rebeca’s compositional verification approach.
From the above properties it is concluded [13] that the formed graph of the
network is a tree. Each node has a single ancestor in the graph. The resulted
graph is connected, because each node has an ancestor. It is also loop free,
because each node has a single path through its ancestor to the root.
The Root Election
The Leader Election problem [23] is a fundamental problem in computer sci-
ence. We do not discuss this algorithm here, and we assume that it is correct.
Unique Designated Bridge
We have to show that with the STP algorithm the designated bridge will
be selected correctly for a LAN. The designated bridge is the one which has
the shortest path to the root, comparing with other bridges connected to the
LAN. In the case of a tie, the bridge with the smaller ID will be elected as
the designated bridge. We consider the LAN that is shown in Figure 5, as a
general LAN with arbitrarily n LANs connected to it. Note that the bridge
numbers in the Figure 5 do not show the bridge IDs. We show that the
designated bridge is elected correctly.
Lemma 5.1 Consider two bridges, i and j, which are connected to a LAN l.
Suppose that the distance of i and j to the root is pathi and pathj, and i is
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Fig. 6. Bridge j is not designated for l
better than j (pathi < pathj or pathi = pathj and i < j). Regardless of what
messages are sent by the environment to l, i and j ,eventually j believes that
it cannot be the designated bridge.
Proof by Compositional Verification We prove the lemma by modeling
the problem in Extended Rebeca and using compositional verification ap-
proach. We choose j as a component and consider the surroundings as an
arbitrary environment (Figure 6). As explained in Section 3, a Hello message
is a triple with three parts: transmitting bridge ID, root ID and distance to
the root. Let 〈bk, rk, xk〉 denotes the messages which are sent to j by LANs
other than l. We make two assumptions, implying that these messages do not
include wrong information: first, xk cannot be smaller than pathk; second,
the environment does not send messages with smaller rk than actual root ID.
So, we force the environment to hold xk in the range [pathj ,∞) and rk in the
range [rootID,∞). These constraints are imposed on the environment to give
a correct belief about the network root to the bridges, and are derived from
the assumptions in [13] to make the STP work correctly.
The code for the main part of the Rebeca model is shown in Figure 7. The
IDs and distances of the bridges i and j are determined nondeterministically
in the main code. The statement x =?(a..b) \ (c) denotes a nondeterministic
assignment to x from the range a to b excluding c. The variables i and j
represent the IDs of the bridges i and j. The variable j is chosen in a non-
deterministic way different from rootID, and i is assigned to be different from
j. After assigning the IDs, the path costs are assigned in such a way to keep
bridge i better than j. The distance of the bridge j to the root is passed to
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main {
byte i;
byte path i;
byte j;
byte path j;
j = ?(0 .. maxID)\(rootID);
i = ?(0 .. maxID)\(j);
if(i == rootID)
path i = 0;
else
path i = ?(1 .. maxDistance);
if(i < j)
path j = ?(path i .. maxDistance);
else
path j = ?(path i .. maxDistance)\(path i);
RootController rootController(portA, portB):(j);
Port portA();
Port portB();
XLan xLan(path j);
Components:
{rootController, portA, portB};
{xLan};
}
Fig. 7. The Rebeca code of the main
the environment rebec, XLan, to prevent XLan to send wrong information to
the component j.
The Xlan rebec in Figure 8 consists of a LAN which generates random
messages. This rebec forms the environment of the component. The assump-
tions about the environment are imposed by assignments in the main, and are
passed to the environment through the initial message server. The sends part
indicates the messages that are sent to the component. The first message is
sent through the LAN l, and there is no constraints on its parameters. The
last two messages are sent to the bridge j from the environment LANs except
l. One of them represents the message containing the actual root ID, and the
other one contains the other valid IDs in the root ID field. The one which
contains the actual root ID should have valid values in its root distance field,
i.e., the distance should not be smaller than the real distance of bridge j.
Property 5.1 shows the formula that needs to be checked for the system.
This formula states that if the bridge j receives a packet from i with these
fields: 〈i, rootID, pathi〉, then eventually the variable isDesignated will be set
to false. And, once it has been set to false its value will remain unchanged.
This variable belongs to the port which connects the bridge j to the LAN
l and when it is set to false it means that j believes that it cannot be the
designated bridge for l.
Property 5.1:  (ProperMessageGotFrom_i →
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externalclass XLan of Lan{
envars{
byte path j;
}
initial(byte path bridge j){
path j = path bridge j;
}
sends{
sendBridge( port1 ID, ?(0 .. maxDistance), ?(rootID .. maxID), ?(0 .. maxID));
sendBridge( port2 ID, ?(0 .. maxDistance),
?(rootID .. maxID)\rootID, ?(0 .. maxID));
sendBridge( port2 ID, ?(path j - 1 .. maxDistance), rootID, ?(0 .. maxID));
}
}
Fig. 8. The Rebeca code of the environment
Number of explored states 6.8123× 106
Memory needed to represent a system state 60 bytes
Total memory usage 22.488 Mega bytes
Depth of state space tree 7081
Table 2
Model checking statistics for designated bridge
( ♦ ((¬port1.isDesignated))))
In the same way we prove that the algorithm can handle the tie condition.
The Rebeca code is model checked and the property is proved to be true. The
statistics of model checking are shown in Table 2. 2
Corollary 5.2 Using STP each LAN will have exactly one designated bridge,
which is the one with the shortest path to the root and the smallest ID.
Consider every pair of the bridges in the LAN. Using Lemma 5.1, and also
the distinctiveness of the bridge IDs we can conclude that only the link to the
correct designated bridge will remain enabled in the network.
Unique Predecessor LAN
Each bridge except the root should maintain a predecessor LAN. Consider
Figure 9. We must prove that if one of the LANs is in the root direction
(so it provides better messages) at last it will be selected as the predecessor
LAN of the bridge. The proof is similar to Lemma 5.1. We pick a bridge and
two ports as a component. We compositionally prove that if one of the ports
gives worse messages to the bridge eventually the bridge believes that the port
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Fig. 9. The bridge predecessor LAN
Number of explored states 1.63059× 106
Memory needed to represent a system state 60 bytes
Total memory usage 106.968 Mega bytes
Depth of state space tree 7762
Table 3
Statistics for predecessor LAN selection
which is not as good as the other one cannot be connected to its predecessor
LAN. With a discussion like Corollary 5.2 we can prove that the selection of
the predecessor LAN is also correct. The property proved to be correct, and
the verification statistics are listed in Table 3.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we formally verified the Spanning Tree Protocol algorithm. We
used compositional verification to generalize the verification process. The
language which used for this purpose is Extended Rebeca, a version of Rebeca
with synchronous message passing and component support. We are working
to expand the usage of Extended Rebeca in verifying the similar algorithms.
We are also working on extending the tool to make it more appropriate for
model checking the network protocols.
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